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ABSTRACT

The insider threat is potentially the most damaging and costly threat to organisations, and
while there is a considerable body of literature aimed at understanding this phenomenon, we
contend that the theories contained in such literature are most beneficial if they can be utilised
in a way that is contextually relevant. Our research, and this paper, is specifically focussed on
developing and improving this contextual validity. We find that malicious acts arising from
disgruntlement are perceived as very real problems in practice. We also present a current list
of non-malicious aberrant behaviours and show how they rank in relative seriousness to one
another. Given that the primary motivation for conducting this study is the view that reliance
on the traditional conceptualisation of a boundary or perimeter is no longer viable, our
essential contribution lies in devising a series of vignettes that empirically reflect this current
contextual validity.
Keywords: Insider Threat, Malicious Behaviour, Non-malicious Behaviour, Computer
Abuse, Data Mobility, Shadow IT.

INTRODUCTION

In the modern networked world, replete with massive amounts of data, one of the greatest
economic threats facing organisations is information loss inflicted by actors either from
within or external to the organisation. While much attention has been paid in the past to the
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external threats, the internal threat is gaining ground in the minds of those concerned with
information security. Recent industry reports have variously described it as a ‘huge problem’
(van Kessel and Allan 2014) or indeed a ‘relentless problem’ (Vorometric 2015) and a
problem that is becoming ‘more serious’ (Trendmicro 2014). Both the FBI and Homeland
Security have warned that “disgruntled and former employees pose a significant cyber threat”
(FBI and DHS 2014) and one of the world’s most respected information security training
organisation reports that 74% of companies are concerned about insider threats (SANS
Institute 2015).
Notably, this concern about the insider threat is not confined to industry and consultant-led
reports. Within the academic field the insider threat has been described as the greatest threat
of all (Warkentin and Willison 2009), a significant threat to organisations (D'Arcy and
Devaraj 2012; D'Arcy and Hovav 2009; D'Arcy et al. 2009), and a major concern (Siponen
and Vance 2010). In fact Vance et al (2013) open their paper by stating that a persistent
problem in information security is insiders who abuse the trust placed in them. Furthermore,
when proposing a research agenda for the Behavioural Information Security field, Willison
and Warkentin (2013) assert that insider computer abuse has the greatest potential for loss and
damage to the employer and they call for research that considers the thought process of the
offender. This current study is motivated by a desire to contribute towards answering this call.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As part of the Behavioural Infosec research field, our overall aim is to contribute to a greater
understanding of non-compliant information security behaviour in the organisational context.
Regarded as being crucial for organisations that want to leverage their human capital
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010), one of the theories used to examine non-compliant behaviour that has
proven popular in prior studies is Deterrence theory. With its origins in the works of early
classical philosophers and subsequent criminological works it was introduced to the
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mainstream IS literature with Straub’s seminal (1990) study, showing that security
countermeasures had a deterrent effect on intentional system misuse. While subsequent
studies extended the theory to show that awareness of these countermeasures was in itself a
deterrent to such behaviour (D'Arcy et al. 2009) others have sought to combine the theory
with other theories. For example in (Siponen and Vance 2010) where Neutralisation Theory
was incorporated, the deterrent effects of all forms of sanctions were rendered insignificant,
and in (Barlow et al. 2013) only one of the three neutralisations examined were found to have
a significant effect on intention to violate policy. Similarly with the inclusion of Ethics
theory, it has been shown that, with the exception of sabotage, codes of ethics have no effect
on computer abuse judgements and intentions (Harrington 1996) while (Hu et al. 2011) point
to the importance of the level of self control among potential offenders. Social Bond Theory
has also been used to examine aberrant behaviour (Cheng et al. 2013) with varying results
between an individual’s bond to co-workers and to the organisation. In summary, when
viewed as a whole, deterrence based studies have to date presented disparate findings. There
are several methodological approaches suggested for addressing this, one of which is to
measure perceived the benefits of the behaviour in question in conjunction with perceived
sanctions (D'Arcy and Herath 2011).
With a view to examining the impact of both sanctions and expected benefits of aberrant
behaviour we have therefore chosen Rational Choice Theory (RCT) as the basis for our
theoretical model (Nagin and Paternoster 1993; Paternoster and Simpson 1996). Commonly
applied in criminal behaviour studies, a succinct description of the theory is available in
(McCarthy 2002) where it is described as:
“The rational choice approach to crime assumes that crime can be understood as if people
choose to offend by using the same principles of cost-benefit analysis they use when selecting
legal behaviours.”
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In addition to the dual focus on both the negative and positive consequences of human choicemaking, our selection of the theory follows the logic expressed in (Paternoster and Simpson
1996; Vance and Siponen 2012) that RCT is particularly appropriate for explaining crimes of
a so-called “white-collar” nature involving a deliberate decision processes. Given that the
focus of this study is insider deliberate actions, it therefore seems appropriate to use RCT as a
fulcrum around which to base our theoretical model.
However, simply adopting a theory or introducing additional constructs to existing theories is
not sufficient. We also need to consider how we operationalise these models, what artefacts
the measurement instruments contain and how we can make them relevant using empirical
means. Effectively we need ensure that they are contextually relevant.
CONTEXTUALISATION

This paper considers contextualisation from two perspectives, namely the position of the
research in the overall body of research and the real world setting that it concerns.
Firstly, at its most basic level contextualisation refers to where within the IS security threat
landscape the research is situated. Loch et al (1992) identified four dimensions of Information
Systems Security, which was subsequently expanded on by Willison and Warkentin (2013)
when they described a continuum of internal violations, ranging from passive non-volitional
non-compliance, to intentional malicious computer abuse. In excluding passive or accidental
actions of employees, this study is firmly placed in the volitional / intentional sphere. Thus
the word “intentional” takes on a critical importance and it is crucial to understand that this
includes both non-malicious as well as malicious actions.
Secondly, contextualisation also concerns the real world setting in which we apply our
research, recognising that the fundamental nature of that world changes over time. In terms of
external threats prior studies have focussed on the technical aspects of information security
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designed to prevent or detect what could be described as intruders (Cavusoglu et al. 2005;
Cavusoglu et al. 2009; Lee and Larsen 2009; Yue and Cakanyildirim 2007). Much of the
internal threat based literature has dealt with issues like inappropriate use of organisational
systems (Liao et al. 2009) or inappropriate accessing of information by employees (Hovav
and D'Arcy 2012). What these studies have as a common denominator is the way in which
they conceptualise information security – as something that can be protected within an
organisational boundary.
However this reliance on the traditional conceptualisation of a boundary or perimeter is no
longer viable in the modern networked world (Edwards 2013; Rebollo et al. 2012; Zissis and
Lekkas 2012). In today’s world of tech-savvy employees, data mobility and flexible working
arrangements, employees’ technology demands are increasingly being met by a multitude of
providers, ultimately giving rise to an information ecosystem that is far removed from the
traditional organisational boundaries.
Such is the rate of the change in the modern world that even language cannot keep pace.
Terms like ‘The Cloud’, ‘BYOD’ and the ubiquitous use of the word ‘apps’ have entered our
everyday lexicon, and connote an idea of data and information mobility. Further descriptions
such as; ‘Stealth IT’, ‘Workaround Systems’ and ‘Feral Systems’ (Fürstenau and Rothe 2014;
Silic and Back 2014), emphasise the lack of agreed definitions but also point to the
relentlessly changing nature of the way we work.
For example, Nasuni (2014) relates the change of emphasis to the availability of technology
and a corresponding “culture of convenient, ‘always on’ access to information” and Schalow
et al. (2013) argue that the blurring of work and personal life boundaries is nothing new but is
driven by the consumerisation of Information Technology. In fact Banham (2015) suggests
that embracing this trend is imperative, primarily because of its inevitability.
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This desire to embrace non-institutional based information solutions is not new however.
More than thirty years ago, using an analogous term “end-user computing” (EUC), Alavi and
Weiss (1985) warned of the organisational risk of what they describe as “a rapidly growing
and irreversible phenomenon”, or as Doll and Torkzadeh (1988) put it “one of the most
significant phenomena to occur in the information systems industry”.
Whatever the reasons for the change in the relationship between technology and work, the
reality is that a common element of the technological behavioural practices that are now in
vogue involves greatly increased dispersion of data and information outside the traditional
perimeter of the organisation. The literature and the discussion above also indicate that
attempting to put a label on this paradigm shift is problematic and so we defer to Silic and
Back (2014) and adopt their language in describing the new IS context as including “all
hardware, software or any other solutions used by employees which are not approved by the
IT department.” The next logical step then is asking to what extent previously used
instruments for testing our behavioural theories are still relevant in this new IS context, and it
is the resulting measurement instruments that the remainder of this paper concerns itself with.
METHODOLOGY

Approach
In acknowledging the debate that exists in the information systems field about the relative
importance of rigour and relevance in research, Siponen and Vance (2014) caution against the
use of research instruments that are out of touch with practice. They suggest a number of
guidelines for instrumentation design that are intended to improve practical relevance of
research in information security without any loss in rigour, and point out that most existing
studies meet less than half of their proposed recommendations – a deficiency that we are
addressing in this and future research.
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However what is of primary concern to this particular paper are their primary guidelines; that
studies should measure specific violations rather than an abstract representation of violations,
and that these should be violations that are deemed important by those practicing in the field
In order to adhere to these primary recommendations, three approaches are suggested (1)
basing topics on a list obtained from literature and getting practitioners to rank them, (2)
developing multiple scenarios and getting comments from practitioners or (3) using a belief
elicitation technique (Limayem and Hirt 2003) to ask practitioners what their greatest
concerns are (Siponen and Vance 2014).

Figure 1: Research Method and Objectives
Our approach has been a combination of all three. In the first instance, a review of the
literature was undertaken to establish a baseline of offences with potential relevance. These
formed the basis for developing an interview protocol used to conduct a series of expert
‘semi-structured’ interviews. However, being cognisant of the sensitive nature of the subject
matter and the potential reticence of respondents to reply to direct questioning, on occasions
the protocol was deviated from during the interview process. The interviews were then
analysed and the principal findings were further examined, for ranking, via a survey
instrument using a separate cohort of information security professionals.
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Interviews

The Linkedin social networking site was used to “connect” with a number of information
security professionals. Their selection was random but was governed by two criteria (a) that
they were senior professionals currently working in information systems security and (b) that
their roles spanned a number of different industries. In order to manage this process, the
search for connections was conducted among the membership of the Irish chapter of ISACA.
It was important to the validity of the study that a comprehensive cross-section of opinions
was elicited and so two internationally active security consultants were also included in the
expert pool to expand the breadth of organisational types in the sample.
Initially, invitations to participate were e-mailed to 19 individuals and interviews were
commenced as soon as the first acceptance was received. The interview protocol was made up
of a series of six primary questions designed to determine the interviewees opinion on (a)
what type of actual actions of employees give them cause for concern; (b) if there are specific
IS policies or standards in their organisation targeted at employees; (c) if the interviewees had
to deal with many security incidents involving insiders and examples thereof; (d) why
employees might break the rules even when they know they exist; (e) the arguments
employees use to defend their actions and (f) if there are any screening measures used in the
hiring of new employees.
Interviews were analysed immediately after completion and it was decided to cease
interviewing new subjects when data saturation was reached. Defined as the point at which
any additional data provides few, if any, new information or suggests new themes (Saunders
et al. 2012) or incremental learning is minimal (Eisenhardt 1989), this occurred after 9
interviews. This was not considered surprising given the design and purpose of the interviews
was to elicit opinions from experienced practitioners on their greatest concerns about
employee behaviour.
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Name

Organisation Description

Job Title

TechCo
ScienCo
PackCorp
LeisCorp
Consult1
FinInst
MajorCo
BankCo
Consult2

Software application development
Multinational scientific manufacturing
Packaging multinational
Gaming multinational
Information Security Consultant
Banking
Manufacturing & Distribution multinational
Banking
Security Consultant

Global Head of Information Security
Senior IS Infrastructure Manager
Group Information Security Officer
Information Security Manager
Owner
Chief Information Security Officer
Head of Information Security
VP Information Security, IT Risk & Controls
Owner

Table 1. Interviewee Demographic Details

In general, interviewees opined that the insider threat was a major issue but initially
equivocated on whether malicious behaviour was of significance. On the subject of nonmalicious behaviours, the majority opinion was that factors like convenience, the trend
towards a data mobility culture and the fact that there are now more employees who believe
they are ‘tech-savvy’ contributes to the problem. A flavour of some of the comments in this
regard is shown in Table 2 below.
Type

Reason

Comment

NonMalicious

Tech Savvy

“We implemented a block of all cloud storage and then we found that people used
the TOR network to bypass our web filter, so that they can still get to the web
version of Dropbox” (TechCo)
“I worked with one company and the HR manager was very proud that she was
backing up all the HR and payroll files every night onto a USB stick. I said ‘very
good and do you store that in your fire-proof safe or do you keep it securely offsite’ and she says ‘oh no it’s kept securely off-site’ and I went ‘very good and
how do you do that?’ and she went ‘well I put it in my gym bag and I bring it
home with me every day’” (Consult 1)
[On the dangers of free wifi – specifically in Boston Logan Airport] “It’s
notorious. So you see something that says “Massport free Wi-Fi” and you go for
it – next thing you’ve bought a lawnmower in Utah. It’s bananas, right? And it’s
constant.” (ScienCo)
“You might have guys in all parts of the organisation, not just in the IT
department, but in a branch somewhere who’ll just say … ‘Ah look, I don’t need
to use that, sure I’ll just use wi-fi or whatever’ so that’s a huge thing” (FinInst)
“As email has proliferated, as people have gotten their own email addresses,
people are still sending stuff to their personal email address when they shouldn’t
be doing so” (MajorCo)
“You can break into three worlds: Personal email, social media and storage
websites. They are your threats.” (LeisureCo)

Convenience

Data
Mobility

Table 2. Examples of ‘non-malicious’ internal security violations

At this point it is worth noting that literature and research methodologies would have us
believe that enquiries of this kind may be limited in what they can determine, due to the
sensitive nature of the topic (Kotulic and Clark 2004) and the reluctance of interviewees to let
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outsiders study their potential security issues (Posey et al. 2011). Therefore, it was anticipated
that the findings of this section of the study would only relate to non-malicious behaviours.
Crucially however, we also found that malicious behaviour was a major concern for those
interviewed. Malicious harming of the organisation was alluded to several times during nearly
every interview, with perimeter security being a major issue. Traditionally, perimeter security
has been regarded as a concern relating to external actors but now it also forms part of the
insider threat. Specifically, employees ‘stealing’ information, data, and intellectual property
represent a real concern, particularly in the context of the disgruntled or displaced employee.
Malicious

Personal Gain

Disgruntlement

“The insider threat has probably moved away from misuse to using the
computers for personal gain or for fraud. I think that’s going to become even
more likely over time”(PackCorp)
“We have had security breaches with either staff leaving the company and
they’ve taken confidential information with them like customer lists and stuff
like that, or in one or two cases where staff have stolen source code and
intellectual property … and in one case went to set up their own company
doing the same type of business, using the source code they had taken … or
taken source code from an internal system that the company was using …
and then the staff member gave it to his brother who set up a company
providing this software as a business solution”(Consult2)
“When people have decided to leave an organisation or the organisation has
decided to let them go, that they send home a brain-dump of a lot of their
stuff - so I’ve come across instances of source code, of strategic plans, of
people’s CVs and it’s all around the topic that people are preparing
themselves for in their next life” (BankCo)
“there will always be disgruntled employees and it’s something we are aware
of … when we go with our quarterly updates to the board the disgruntled
employee mightn’t be at the top of the list like it would have been 3-4 years
ago, but it’s still a risk” (FinInst)
“… you always have the disgruntled leaver factor and that is genuinely an
issue … now people who don’t have privileges on systems, it’s not so much a
big deal, because there’s not so much damage they can do but … y’know the
other concern is people deliberately stealing information. So it’s one thing to
send your information to your own Gmail account, but the fact that we now
have things like oneDrive for Business and you can fire up all of these files to
your oneDrive account - pull them down when you get home, have no
traceability on them … even if we had Data Loss Prevention (DLP) software
… if DLP was looking specifically at email it wouldn’t show up this … and if
you go off to a competitor and you are a sales or marketing person, you’re
pulling that proprietary information or even planning information for the
following financial year and bringing it to your competitors … or to your
new employers” (MajorCo)

Table 3. Examples of ‘malicious’ internal security violations

The difficulty in obtaining complete and open responses in information security studies has
long been problematic (Crossler et al. 2013; Guo et al. 2011). Bearing this in mind it was
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therefore not surprising that when pressed on malicious threats, interviewees indicated that it
was a real concern but in general showed a certain amount of reticence in divulging details or
examples. This may be because asking people responsible for information security about what
concerns them in relation to employee behaviours is effectively something that requires more
than a modicum of self-reflection and self-criticism, if they are to answer honestly.
Paradoxically this seems to be more pronounced in relation to non-malicious behaviours,
presumably because practitioners feel that they should be able to prevent these from
happening. Therefore, in an effort to get a better understanding of the relative importance of
each of the behaviours, rather than simply confirming that they exist, a logical next step was
to introduce a layer of anonymity. This formed the second part of our “contextual”
investigation – using an anonymised survey instrument.
Mini - Survey

A very parsimonious questionnaire was prepared which contained, in addition to some
demographic questions, a list and brief description of 11 insider threats (derived from the
findings of the previously conducted interviews). These were exclusively of the type
categorised as ‘non-malicious’ – a research strategy that was adopted because what was being
sought from respondents was a ranking of the seriousness of offences and it was assumed that
all malicious acts would be regarded as extremely serious. The 11 offences offered for rating
are shown in Table 4 below.

1

Name
Email (1)

2

Email (2)

3

USB Backup

4
5

Other Mobile
Devices
Social Media (1)

6

Social Media (2)

Organisation Description
employees / contractors emailing the organisation's
information to an unsecured email (such as their home address) in order to
work on information off-site
contractors setting up auto-forwarding of emails to alternative email
addresses when away from the office
employees / contractors using USB memory storage to 'backup' sensitive
organisation data
employees / contractors using 'tablets' or 'phablets' to work on
organisation data
employees / contractors using social media without approval and thus
exposing the organisation to possible phishing attacks
employees / contractors publishing inappropriate or sensitive
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7

Remote Login

8

Wi-Fi (1)

9
10
11

Wi-Fi (2)
Cloud Storage
Browsers

organisational information on social media platforms
employees / contractors installing software to enable their own
unauthorised remote login
employees / contractors using public unsecured or unapproved wi-fi
networks to conduct organisation business
employees / contractors creating their own unsecured wi-fi networks
employees / contractors using unauthorised online data storage services
employees / contractors availing of services such as the TOR network to
circumvent access control measures

Table 4. Rating Offences

The questionnaire also contained an open-ended, free form question, requesting respondents
to offer their own opinions on the most significant sources of insider threat behaviour. The
survey was posted on the ISACA Ireland LinkedIn webpage and over a two-week period
received a total of 33 responses.
Approximately one third of the respondents were Information Security Consultants with a
similar amount of Information Security Managers and the remainder were spread across
General Management, Internal Audit, Risk Management and Security Analysis roles - over 70
per cent of respondents classified their positions as senior or middle management.
The interview instructions asked respondents to rate the “offences” on a 5-point seriousness
scale. The instruction on seriousness was further defined as respondents’ own opinion of the
threat, viewed from the twin perspectives of the likelihood of it occurring and the potential
impact on the organisation if it did occur. The scale ranged from ‘Not Serious’ to ‘Extremely
Serious’, with a midpoint of ‘Serious’.
Combining the product of 11 offences and 33 respondents yields a total of 363 responses to
potential insider threat behaviours. Of these, only 72 (20%) fall into the categories of “Not
Serious” or “A Little Serious” meaning that the remaining 80% represent concerns of
significance in the eyes of the sample surveyed. Overall, the number of respondents that rated
the offences as serious was relatively evenly spread across the offence categories. However,
when we examined the number of responses that categorised offences as “Extremely
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Serious”, a slightly different picture emerged. The most serious offence according to our
sample is the idea of employees or contractors installing software to enable their own
unauthorised remote login. This is followed by; employees / contractors creating their own
Wi-Fi networks; and using services such as the TOR network to circumvent access control
measures. Surprisingly, and contrary to popular opinion, two of the lower scores in this
category relate to the use of tablets and “phablet” devices in the conduct of business and the
use of unapproved social media or using social media in an inappropriate manner.
A summary of the responses is shown in Table 5 below.
“Offence”
(see also Table 4)
Remote Login
Wi-Fi (2)
Browsers
USB Backup
Social Media (2)
Wi-Fi (1)
Cloud Storage
Email (2)
Email (1)
Social Media (1)
Other Mobile Devices
Totals

Not
Serious
1
0
1
0
0
2
3
1
0
1
1
10

A little
Serious

72
20%

2
6
6
3
4
8
6
6
3
10
8
62

Serious
2
6
4
4
4
2
3
4
8
5
8
50

Very
Serious
8
5
6
11
12
8
8
10
11
10
10
99
291
80%

Extremely
Serious
20
16
16
15
13
13
13
12
11
7
6
142

Table 5. Survey Results

While the dataset in this survey is reasonably small, it is noteworthy that it was conducted
among a cohort of professionals in the field of information security who, by virtue of their
membership of the LinkedIn group, are actually operating in the field. No inducements for
participation were offered to respondents, save for an undertaking to revert with the results of
the survey, and so the responses are assumed to be truthful.
The open-ended question in the questionnaire simply asked respondents to name and give a
brief description of any other additional actions of insiders, which they believed could present
a significant security threat. Of the 19 (55%) respondents who offered a view on this question
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the majority related to non-malicious behaviours and mirrored some of those offered for
ranking in the earlier section of the questionnaire. Additional non-malicious behaviours
included the use of “Shadow IT”, “Abuse of access controls”, “not using encryption”,
“carelessness” and “the use of screen-grab tools and unauthenticated printers”.
Several respondents only considered this question from a malicious perspective, despite not
being prompted to. For example one respondent cited disgruntled employees and the notion of
Intellectual Property Plagiarists. Others referred to employees walking out with confidential
data or removal of data via unmonitored websites, and two of the survey respondents
specified as concerns the downloading and sale of confidential data to competitors / black
market and creating backdoors into the enterprise network for unapproved use.
To summarise the data overall, the ‘non-malicious’ actions of the “insider” that our survey
respondents deemed most serious, revolve around the mobility of data, circumventing security
controls for convenience purposes, and using third party or open source technologies in the
workplace.
On the malicious side the theft of information or intellectual property was the most cited
offence in both the interviews and mini-survey, occurring primarily with disgruntled and
departing employees. What was surprising was that not only was it a concern, but that
information security professionals readily admitted that it worried them. Thus while nonmalicious behaviour of insiders has been the more popular focus for prior behavioural studies
in this area, it is our contention that it is remiss to ignore malicious behaviours.
Our findings clearly show that the priorities of information security professionals have
changed with regard to the insider threat, and the fact that malicious acts of employees are
now openly viewed as a major concern rather than the tacit acknowledgement that they
previously received, means that academic research should do likewise.
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Methodologically, a significant amount of such academic research has previously employed
the use of hypothetical vignettes (Weber 1992). What this research indicates is that a new set
of vignettes, with specifics set firmly in the domain of current security concerns in practice, is
needed. Therefore testing our theories requires that this be reflected in our measurement
instruments. With this in mind, and drawing on the findings from our empirical work for
context, we have developed a series of four vignettes to be used in future studies that are
presented in Appendix A to this paper.

CONCLUSION

Although research on malicious behaviour by disgruntled employees has previously been
called for (Crossler et al. 2013; Willison and Warkentin 2013) our study is, to the best of our
knowledge, one of the first to put it on the research agenda using empirical methods.
A second and equally compelling finding from this research is in relation to the types of rule
breaking behaviour that are of greatest concern. This study clearly shows that behaviours
examined in much of the prior literature (looking at passwords, sharing logins, sending
inappropriate email etc) are no longer alone at the forefront in terms of importance. They have
been replaced by behaviours concerning remote login, creation of personal wi-fi networks and
circumventing browser controls.
Given the argument in (Siponen and Vance 2014) that studies in this area must measure
specific behaviours then these two findings along with the creation of the resulting vignettes
represent significant contributions to the field.
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APPENDIX A – SCENARIOS AND CONSISTENCY CHECK RESULTS
1.

Non-Malicious Scenarios

•

Remote Login (employees / contractors installing software to enable their own unauthorised remote
login)
Mike1 is a manager in a medium sized company and although not from an IT background, he considers
himself to be reasonably up to date with modern technology and trends. Because of the demands of his job
Mike1 would like to have remote access to the company’s servers so that he could work from home in the
evenings3. He has submitted an application to the IT department to be granted this access using the
company’s virtual private network, but he hasn’t heard back from the IT department in six months2. While
browsing the web Mike1 discovers a website offering free remote control of any computer over the internet
and decides to investigate. He knows that it is against the rules in his organisation to load any software on
company computers without authorisation4 but is re-assured by glowing testimonials on the website, so
Mike1 goes ahead and downloads the software to both his work and home computer giving himself remote
access5.

•

Wi-Fi (employees / contractors creating their own unsecured wi-fi networks)
Peter1 is a branch manager in busy company with branches nationwide. Recently the branch has expanded
and Peter1 hired some new clerical staff, but has had difficulty arranging appropriate accommodation.
Head-office supplied the branch with a ‘portable’ office unit but he is frustrated by the inaction of the
Head-Office IT department in installing the necessary wiring and connections for the computers in the new
office2. He knows that it is against company rules for anyone other than IT department personnel to install
computer-networking equipment4 but he is worried about the upcoming end-of-year reporting
requirements3. Previously Peter1 successfully set up his own home Wi-Fi network, so he buys the
equipment necessary from the local computer store to extend the network wirelessly into the new office.
Peter1 then proceeds to install the Wi-Fi network extension during his lunchtime neglecting to change the
default password5. He is pleased to inform the staff after lunch that they are now connected in their new
office.
1
2
3
4
5
160

Number of times character’s name mentioned = 4
Manipulation in the story = Impatience
Motivation for the act non-malicious ?
* See definition of non-malicious below
Explicit that the act is against company rules
Phrase that says the act was performed by the character
Wordcount

Definition of Non-Malicious
According to Guo (2011), Non Malicious Security Violations are characterised as being: (a) intentional –
differentiating them from accidental violations; (b) self-benefitting without malicious intent – or not intending to
harm the company or indeed personally profit at the company’s expense; (c) voluntary – end users know they
are breaking the rules; (d) Have the potential to cause damage or present a security risk
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2.

Malicious Scenarios

•

Disgruntlement / personal gain
John1 has worked for Buildco plc for the past 25 years preparing bids for major construction projects. Despite
being central to the success of the company, John1 is annoyed that he remains in middle management while
several people he mentored are senior managers2. He has been approached by a rival company to join their
senior management and has secretly accepted their offer. Buildco plc has strict rules around confidentiality
whereby only senior management make the final adjustments to bids which are then not seen by anybody else.
However, John’s1 current boss regularly asks him to help her finalise her bids. During a recent meeting, when
his boss was called from the office for a private call, John1, who is aware of the company’s strict policy on
confidentiality4, emailed the file that they were working on, from her computer to his contact in the rival
construction company (and deleted the email)5, so his new prospective new employers could win the
contract3.

•

Disgruntlement / personal gain II
Tom1 has worked in the accounts department of the same company since he left school. However, despite
being excellent at his job Tom1 hasn’t progressed significantly, continually being passed over by others with
professional qualifications2. Early on in his career Tom1developed a habit of bringing work home in his
briefcase and recently he has taken to uploading the details of most of his daily work to a shared cloud storage
drive. Although he knows that this is against the company rules4, his boss has a habit of ringing him outside
of office hours and demanding answers to questions so he feels that this rule violation is necessary. Recently,
a rival company has approached Tom1 with a job offer, which he has accepted. However, before handing in
his notice, he downloads all the information from the cloud storage drive to his personal laptop 5, thinking
that being armed with this information might help him to get ahead in his new job3.

1
2
3
4
5
160

Number of times character’s name mentioned = 4
Manipulation in the story = Annoyance
Motivation for the act malicious ?
* See definition of malicious below
Explicit that the act is against company rules ?
Phrase that says the act was performed by the character
Wordcount

Definition of Malicious
Guo’s (2011), characterisation of Non Malicious Security Violations can also be used to frame Malicious
Violations by substituting “with malicious intent” for “without malicious intent” in part (b) of the definition and so
are characterised here as: (a) intentional; (b) self-benefitting with malicious intent; (c) voluntary; (d) Have the potential to
cause damage or present a security risk .
In defining “with malicious intent” we take note of the fact that Guo (2011) excluded from his definition of nonmalicious acts, those acts that are unethical and benefit the end user at the organisation’s expense, and so they
are included in the definition of malicious security violations.
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